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Abstract We investigate whether public support for
innovation increases the propensity of SMEs in tradi-
tional manufacturing industries to cooperate for innova-
tion—in particular, for incremental innovation—with
other firms and external knowledge providers. Using
data from seven EU regions, we find that support
programmes do not promote cooperation with compet-
itors, marginally promote cooperation with customers
and suppliers and strongly promote cooperation with
knowledge providers. These findings suggest that, in
this case, the role of public policy is systems conforming
rather than systems creating. Innovation support
programmes can assist SMEs in traditional manufactur-
ing industry to consolidate and/or extend their innova-
tion ecosystems beyond familiar business partners by
promoting cooperation with both private and public
sector knowledge providers. Finally, our findings sug-
gest that evaluation studies of innovation support
programmes should be designed to capture not only
input and/or output additionality but also behavioural
and systemic effects.
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Innovation ecosystems . Innovation policy . Cooperation
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1 Introduction
Gomes et al. (2016) chart the transition from the busi-
ness ecosystem to the innovation ecosystem concept,
demonstrating that in this joint literature ‘innovation’
has been the most cited keyword since 2006 and that,
since 2011, both ‘networks’ and ‘collaboration’ have
joined the list of the 10 most cited keywords. These
concerns reflect the systems view that innovation is an
interactive process; in particular, that innovative firms
require the creation of a cooperative network, which is
essential for their evolution (Scaringella and Radziwon
2018). We extend this literature by providing evidence
that public support programmes, by promoting cooper-
ation, can contribute to the well-functioning of innova-
tion ecosystems in traditional manufacturing industries,
a context which—to the best of our knowledge—has not
yet been explored by the innovation ecosystems litera-
ture and is largely ignored in the wider innovation
literature. To this end, we evaluate whether and, if so,
to what extent innovation support programmes for
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European SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries
induce cooperative behaviour for innovation.
The importance of cooperation is a corollary of evo-
lutionary perspectives on innovation as the outcome of
systems. In contrast to mainstream theories motivating
public support for innovation, the evolutionary perspec-
tive points to the central role of cooperation and thus co-
evolution between institutions in the functioning of sys-
tems of innovation (Chaminade et al. 2018). According
to Mazzucato (2016, p. 99), the ‘evolutionary emphasis
on transformation and structural change has led to the
concept of Bsystems of innovation^, which posits that
firms are embedded in a national network of institutions
– in both public and private sectors’. From this perspec-
tive, innovation outcomes are influenced by the quantity
and quality of cooperation between the institutions in the
network. The recent innovation ecosystems literature
also highlights the importance of firms’ cooperation for
innovation (Durst and Poutanen 2013; Gobble 2014).
According to Gobble (2014, p. 55), innovation ecosys-
tems can be defined as ‘dynamic, purposive communi-
ties with complex, interlocking relationships built on
collaboration, trust, and co-creation of value and special-
izing in exploitation of a shared set of complementary
technologies or competencies’.1 The concept is similar to
the theories of national and regional innovation systems,
insofar as both theoretical perspectives regard innova-
tions as open and interactive processes, although the
ecosystems concept places greater emphasis on the role
of market forces (Papaioannou et al. 2009; Durst and
Poutanen 2013; Oh et al. 2016). Innovation ecosystems,
whether at national or regional level, include the same
players—i.e. companies, universities, entrepreneurs,
customers, regulatory agencies and government bodies
at all administrative levels (Gobble 2014). Moreover,
there is an affinity between recent literature on entrepre-
neurial ecosystems and the literature on innovation sys-
tems, especially the focus on the relational elements
within multi-actor networks at the regional level (Acs
et al. 2017; Brown and Mason 2017).
Oh et al. (2016, p. 5) identify limitations of the
emerging ecosystems approach to understanding inno-
vation, including: (i) the emphasis on market forces
(‘business-only ecosystem’) ‘seems inconsistent with
the trend to open innovation’; (ii) ‘special kinds of
complex system behaviour have yet to be substantiated’;
and (iii) it ‘offers no ready metrics’. Together, these
limitations provide a context for the contribution of this
study, which evaluates the role of public policy in pro-
moting cooperation as a measurable outcome. Evalua-
tion of innovation policies has been mainly conducted
within the confines of mainstream theories of public
support for innovation and, hence, has mainly been
concerned with input and output additionalities. Yet
focussing on innovation inputs and outputs means that
we stay outside the ‘black box’ of innovation processes
(OECD 2006). Conversely, broadening the theoretical
underpinnings of evaluation studies to include evolu-
tionary insights and systems perspectives on innovation
enables more complete assessment of the impact of
public measures on firms’ innovative behaviour
(Buisseret et al. 1995; Georghiou and Clarysse 2006).
In particular, cooperation potentially induced by inno-
vation support programmes is a form of behavioural
additionality (OECD 2006; Falk 2007; Wanzenbӧck
et al. 2013).2 This study contributes to this broader
approach to the evaluation of innovation support poli-
cies by analysing the same dataset as [Radicic et al.
2016, p. 1425] who report that ‘for participants, the
estimated effects of publicly funded innovation support
programmes on SMEs in traditional manufacturing in-
dustries are positive, typically increasing the probability
of innovation and of its commercial success by around
15%’. In this study, we report that the innovation sup-
port programmes investigated by [Radicic et al. 2016]
give rise in addition to behavioural benefits in the form
of ‘network or cooperation additionality’. In turn, in
Section 3 below, we argue that by giving rise to more
cooperation than there would otherwise be (i.e. in the no
policy support counterfactual), innovation support
programmes may contribute to the well-functioning of
innovation ecosystems and thus promote cooperative
innovation performance in ways not accounted for in
traditional evaluation studies. Accordingly, our main
research question is whether public support measures
1 The literature does not provide a robust definition of innovation
ecosystems and Oh et al. (2016) argue that the concept adds very little
to the traditional systems of innovation approach.
2 Behavioural additionality is defined broadly as the effect of public
intervention on firms’ innovative behaviour (Buisseret et al. 1995).
However, in common with most empirical studies (Georghiou and
Clarysse 2006), we investigate only the impact of public intervention
on firms’ cooperative behaviour, which is defined variously as scope
additionality (Falk 2007) or network additionality (OECD 2006).
Scope or network additionality occurs when the likelihood of a firm
cooperating for innovation increases as a result of participation in a
support programme (Busom and Fernández-Ribas 2008).
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are effective in fostering cooperative behaviour among
SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries.
We draw on a unique dataset of SMEs in six indus-
tries across seven EU regions and employ matching
estimators to investigate the impact of public support
measures on cooperation for innovation. Because all of
the SMEs in the dataset are in manufacturing industries
commonly described as ‘traditional’, and few such firms
receive support for R&D activities, the support mea-
sures investigated in this study are the ones designed
to promote both technological and non-technological
innovation outputs (as defined in the Oslo Manual,
OECD 2005).3 The next section explains why it is
important to investigate SME behaviour within the par-
ticular context of traditional manufacturing industry,
rather than within broader, less differentiated sector(s);
and why, in consequence, this study also contributes
towards understanding SME cooperation in the context
of incremental innovation. Given that we focus on
SMEs, that traditional manufacturing industry is a co-
herent unit of analysis, mainly conducting incremental
innovation, and that the relevant mix of public support
programmes is distinct, we cannot assume that the hy-
potheses informed by the literature—which is both
scarce and relating to other contexts—are completely
appropriate for the investigation in this article. Accord-
ingly, in Section 3, in the absence of a relevant literature
on traditional manufacturing in general and on tradition-
al manufacturing SMEs in particular, our hypotheses are
informed both by the existing literature and by the
context of our investigation.
2 Context: the continuing importance of traditional
manufacturing industry and the focus
on incremental innovation
One novelty of this study is its focus not only on SMEs
but, specifically, on SMEs in traditional manufacturing
industry. Radicic et al. [2016, p. 1427] eschew the
identification of traditional manufacturing with ‘low-
tech’, instead of defining traditional manufacturing in-
dustry as a coherent unit of analysis in terms of a number
of related characteristics: long established; once a main
source of employment, at least at the sub-regional level;
in the mature or declining phase of their industry life
cycle, with recent decline typically associatedwith glob-
alisation; relatively labour intensive, hence vulnerable to
out-sourcing to other countries; but retaining a capacity
for innovation, ‘through which they continue to be
important sources of wealth creation and employment’.
The authors also document that traditional industries
conceptualised in this manner include the six considered
in this study and that, in the period 2009–2012, these six
industries accounted for upwards of 40% of all
manufacturing jobs in the seven EU regions considered
in this study. Moreover, ‘the importance of traditional
manufacturing industry is not confined to these seven
regions but is common throughout the EU’ [Radicic et
al. 2016, p. 1430]. Indeed, ‘in around half of EU re-
gions, the share of these traditional industries in
manufacturing employment increased over these 15
years [1995-2009]; and in 78 EU regions, the increase
exceeded 4.5%’. Although rather neglected by the inno-
vation literature, traditional manufacturing remains an
important source of employment and wealth creation in
the developed economies. Our investigation of cooper-
ation for innovation in traditional manufacturing indus-
try is thus not a novelty for its own sake but responds to
policy concerns throughout the EU and in the USA to
better understand and promote traditional sector inno-
vation [Radicic et al. 2016, pp. 1427 and 1430].
A further contribution of the present study is a cor-
ollary of our focus on cooperation for innovation by
SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries, namely,
an implied focus on incremental innovation. In
discussing the slowdown of productivity growth across
the developed market economies, Nobel Laureate Ed-
mund Phelps (2015, p. 56) conjectures that: ‘The plau-
sible explanation of the syndrome… is a critical loss of
indigenous innovation in the established industries like
traditional manufacturing and services that was not
nearly offset by the innovation that flowered in a few
new industries – digital, media and financial.’ While
Phelps does not use the term ‘radical innovation’, his
concept of indigenous innovation is similar. The corol-
lary is that in the context of traditional manufacturing
industry, current innovation is largely incremental,
which is consistent with Faems et al. (2005). This im-
plication is reinforced by our focus on SMEs, given
3 Firms in traditional industries receive more support than do firms in
other manufacturing sectors from the following measures [Radicic et
al. 2016]: subsidies and loans for acquiring machinery, equipment or
software; support for internationalisation, e.g. by providing financial
assistance for attending or participating in trade fairs or trade missions;
networking with other companies; brokering collaborations—e.g. with
outside experts, with universities or with large firms’ supply chains;
and providing information on market needs, market conditions, new
regulations, etc.
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evidence consistent with the Schumpeter (1942) hypoth-
esis that large firms are the ones with the greatest pro-
pensity to introduce products with higher degrees of
novelty (O’Connor and DeMartino 2006; O’Connor
2008, p. 62; Tellis 2013, p. 240). Previous studies of
cooperation have emphasised that the degree or breadth
of cooperation is important in enhancing firms’ abilities
to develop radical innovation; indeed, that ‘collabora-
tion was more frequent among firms pursuing higher
level rather than incremental innovations… because…
firms introducing innovations with a greater degree of
novelty are more likely to use a wider range of informa-
tion sources to develop or improve their products’
(Nieto and Santamaria 2007, p. 368, citing Tether
2002; and Amara and Landry 2005). The context of
the present study is thus not only a contribution in its
own right but also entails the additional contribution of
investigating cooperation for innovation where innova-
tion is overwhelmingly incremental (Faems et al. 2005).
3 Literature review: innovation support
programmes and cooperation for innovation
3.1 Innovation ecosystems, cooperation and public
support programmes
The ecosystems approach to understanding innovation
has an affinity with open innovation theory
(Chesbrough 2003) in moving beyond individual firm
performance to focus on knowledge transfer within
cooperative relationships between firms and related in-
stitutions (Durst and Poutanen 2013; Oh et al. 2016;
Song 2016). However, thinking on ecosystems seems to
suggest in addition a cumulative causation effect. On the
one hand, cooperation at the micro level is one of two
core attributes, along with integrated value chains, of
innovation ecosystems (Xu et al. 2018). This is consis-
tent with Song (2016, p. 14): ‘… multiple organisations
… integrate their resources and form an environment
that leads to the research and development of new
technological applications… and improves the innova-
tion ecosystem’s cooperative performance’. On the oth-
er hand, there may be emergent properties at the macro
or system level that enhance innovation and enlarge the
scope for cooperation at the micro level. For example,
the greater the technological diversity of firms’ alliance
partners, the greater their ‘exploratory innovation’
(according to Phelps and Paris 2010, cited by Song
2016, p. 14). Yet, from the perspective of the wider
innovation ecosystem in which these firms are located,
the greater the technological diversity, the greater the
opportunities for all firms to cooperate to innovate more
complex products that are harder to imitate and thus a
source of individual competitive advantage (drawing on
Song 2016). In this case, firm-level cooperation for
innovation is at the base of an ‘ecosystem’ whose emer-
gent properties give rise to positive feedback on coop-
erative innovative performance at the firm level … and
so on. In this case, estimating the effects of public
innovation support programmes on firms’ cooperative
behaviour (whether intended or unintended) is a contri-
bution to understanding the role that public policy may
play in contributing to the well-functioning of innova-
tion ecosystems. Moreover, a corollary of this potential
to propagate innovation via a process of cumulative
causation (firm–ecosystem–firm … and so on) is that
the effects of public innovation support policies may
unfold over time and thus go beyond the immediate and
short-run innovation effects—innovation inputs (e.g.
R&D expenditure) and outputs (e.g. technological and
non-technological innovations)—that dominate the
evaluation literature.
In spite of the emphasis on market mechanisms in
innovation ecosystems thinking, this emerging literature
does embrace the role of public policy.4 The particular
focus of our study is on the effectiveness of public
support in promoting firms’ cooperative behaviour,
which supports the dynamism of innovation ecosys-
tems. The literature evaluating innovation support
programmes has previously highlighted the impact of
public support on firms’ cooperative ties, whether
through networking or partnershipswith other economic
agents (Georghiou 2004; Hall and Maffioli 2008;
Breschi et al. 2009; Antonioli and Marzucchi 2012).
Accordingly, public intervention might enable firms to
establish cooperative ties or strengthen existing ones
(Aschhoff et al. 2006). In turn, by engaging in external
relations, firms acquire and improve knowledge and
learning capabilities (Clarysse et al. 2009; Afcha
Chàvez 2011).
4 Tassey (2010, pp. 283, 322 and 305) argues for a ‘new innovation
model … to guide economic growth policy’ in the USA and that the
‘overriding policy question is how to expand and improve the efficien-
cy of this (i.e. the national US) increasingly complex and diversified
innovation ecosystem’. To this end, the ‘government role will require
both larger R&D spending and new and more efficient mechanisms for
R&D funding and technology diffusion’.
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From different theoretical perspectives, government
intervention to promote cooperation for innovation may
stem from incomplete appropriation of knowledge spill-
overs generated through cooperative ties, systemic fail-
ures reducing firms’ willingness to cooperate or re-
source limitations reducing their ability to cooperate.
For example, public support might encourage
internalisation of knowledge spillovers from coopera-
tion (i.e. learning effects) as a complementary objective
to fostering firms’ innovation activities (Autio et al.
2008; Afcha Chàvez 2011). In other words, public in-
tervention might yield ‘a learning-enhancing externality
beyond the direct effect of firm-specific R&D subsidy’
(Autio et al. 2008, p. 60).
The literature evaluating innovation support
programmes, in particular that part embracing behav-
ioural additionality (influenced by evolutionary think-
ing), identifies ways in which public support may posi-
tively influence cooperative behaviour (Antonioli and
Marzucchi 2012; Gӧk and Edler 2012). Buisseret et al.
(1995) introduced the concept of behavioural
additionality to describe the change in firms’ behaviour
as a consequence of public policy. It refers to knowledge
acquisition and developments of learning and R&D
management capabilities, competencies and strategies,
including cooperation strategies (Antonioli and
Marzucchi 2012; Gӧk and Edler 2012; Wanzenbӧck
et al. 2013). Georghiou (2002) hypothesised that behav-
ioural additionality can occur as a consequence of public
interventions even when input and/or output
additionality does not take place, although this is
contested by Clarysse et al. (2009, p. 1524) who argue
on both theoretical and empirical grounds that input
additionality and behavioural additionality are ‘highly
correlated’. Although scarce, most empirical studies on
behavioural additionality focus on firms’ cooperation
strategies and report positive effects from innovation
support programmes (Fier et al. 2006; Busom and
Fernández-Ribas 2008; Fernández-Ribas and Shapira
2009). Of these, most report larger additionality effects
for public-private partnerships than for cooperation with
other businesses (Fier et al. 2006; Busom and
Fernández-Ribas 2008). Indeed, Afcha Chàvez (2011)
and Antonioli et al. (2014) report no innovation policy
effects on vertical cooperation (with customers and sup-
pliers), while the latter even found a negative impact of
regional policy on horizontal cooperation (with compet-
itors). In summary, most studies report positive effects of
innovation support programmes on firms’ cooperation
behaviour, but the magnitude and significance vary de-
pending on the type of cooperative partnerships.
Table 7 in the Appendix highlights the main features
of the previous empirical studies on behavioural
additionality, all of which encompass cooperation, and
enumerates the main differences with the present study.
Few studies have expressly focussed on behavioural
additionality across country boundaries, with a focus on
either a single country (Falk 2007; Busom and
Fernández-Ribas 2008; Clarysse et al. 2009; Hsu et al.
2009; Afcha Chàvez 2011; Wanzenbӧck et al. 2013) or
region (Antonioli et al. 2014). Only one study, with
limited coverage, included traditional sectors (Falk
2007), although it reports no specific results for tradition-
al manufacturing. Heterogeneity by firm size was not
investigated in any of the studies, with only a few inves-
tigating heterogeneity by source of funding: Afcha
Chàvez (2011)—EU funding not separately identified;
Wanzenbӧck et al. (2013)—national funding only; and
Antonioli et al. (2014)—regional funding only. This
study makes its particular contribution by drawing upon
a cross-country sample, by focussing exclusively upon
traditional manufacturing industries (otherwise neglected
in the literature, as we argue in Section 2 above), and by
investigating policy effects on SME cooperative behav-
iour with respect both to firm size heterogeneity and to
different sources of funding. Accordingly, the present
study complements the existing literature.
Innovation support programmes used by SMEs in
traditional manufacturing industry mainly target innova-
tion outputs, although some seek to promote cooperative
behaviour in particular. However, the literature suggests
that innovation support of all kinds tends to promote
behavioural change, whether directly or indirectly, in-
cluding the propensity to cooperate. This perspective
informs the present study by suggesting that it is reason-
able to analyse the behavioural effects of participation in
all types of innovation support programmes. The next
section explains how cooperation for innovation informs
hypotheses that we can test using our data on SMEs in
traditional manufacturing.
3.2 Hypothesis development
The literature identifies many advantages of cooperation
for innovation: cost reduction by exploiting economies
of scale and scope (Hagedoorn 1993; Teirlinck and
Spithoven 2012); sharing risk and uncertainty related
to innovation (Hagedoorn 1993; Rese and Baier 2011);
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and opting to ‘buy’, instead of ‘make’, when transaction
costs are low (Williamson 1985). In addition, ‘speed to
market’ is particularly important for SMEs—i.e. rapid
commercialisation of inventions to capture innovation
returns and overcome appropriability issues (Leiponen
and Byma 2009; Rese and Baier 2011). Yet Hoffmann
and Schlosser (2001) find that SMEs greatly underesti-
mate some of the critical success factors for successful
cooperation, such as partnership governance and profes-
sional management, and often lack the managerial skills
and experience necessary for developing and maintain-
ing successful cooperative ties. In turn, this suggests a
channel through which public support for any type of
innovative activity—i.e. by relieving resource con-
straints—may help to promote cooperative activity.
The literature not only identifies advantages of coop-
eration but also suggests circumstances that condition
firm preferences regarding types of cooperation. We
now explain how theory, which relates mainly to firms
in general rather than to SMEs in particular; character-
istics of SME innovation in traditional manufacturing
industry; and the data available for this study together
lead us to frame hypotheses regarding SME cooperation
with customers and suppliers, competitors, private
knowledge providers and public knowledge providers.
Different types of cooperative partner entail different
breadth of knowledge base and ease of access (Un et al.
2010). With respect to vertical cooperation with cus-
tomers and suppliers, cooperation with suppliers is
characterised by a limited scope of knowledge breadth,
because often the focal firm and its suppliers operate in
similar industries, but the focal firm can access that
knowledge more easily than when cooperating with
customers. On the other hand, cooperation with cus-
tomers provides firms with broader knowledge but more
limited access (Un et al. 2010).
Following the resource-based theory of the firm, in
cooperating for innovation, firms can seek to access
either complementary or similar resources (Arranz and
de Arroyabe 2008; Chun and Mun 2012). The main
reason for vertical cooperation on innovation is that
firms gain access to complementary resources and ca-
pabilities (Arranz and de Arroyabe 2008; Un et al.
2010). By providing technological knowledge, sup-
pliers usually help firms to improve their current prod-
ucts, introduce new products and/or reduce costs
through process innovation (Belderbos et al. 2004; Un
et al. 2010), while cooperation with customers is partic-
ularly relevant in the commercialisation phase of
innovation (Von Hippel 1988; Belderbos et al. 2004;
Arranz and de Arroyabe 2008). In industries with a
mature technological level, such as traditional
manufacturing, firms cooperate with customers to ex-
ploit and optimise existing technologies (Faems et al.
2005). Moreover, the importance of ‘speed to market’
for SMEs (noted above) may apply with particular force
to traditional sector SMEs; because they seldom register
patents or engage in other formal ways of protecting
intellectual property rights (Leiponen and Byma 2009),
cooperation to secure deliveries from suppliers and/or
sales to existing customers may be a particular priority.
In line with this discussion, we investigateHypothesis 1:
The impact of public support has a positive impact on
vertical cooperation with customers and suppliers.
Mutual trust between partners is often identified as
a key success factor in collaborative relationships
(Barge-Gil 2010; Lee et al. 2010). As a potential
partner can behave opportunistically and obtain infor-
mation about new technologies without paying for
them, firms may lack incentives to reveal their internal
inventions. Accordingly, empirical studies regularly
report that weak appropriability has a negative effect
on cooperation for innovation (Lhuillery and Pfister
2009). Barge-Gil (2010) concludes that forcing firms
to collaborate can be counterproductive and creates a
climate of mistrust, while Lee et al. (2010) discuss
potential negative effects of cooperation in the context
of small and medium-sized firms. Conversely, public
support measures might help firms to overcome bar-
riers to cooperation as well as to mitigate cooperation
failure (Busom and Fernández-Ribas 2008).
Cooperation failure refers to reduced effort in coop-
erative partnerships when cooperating firms do not
clearly specify which partner will be assigned exclusive
property rights (Dhont-Peltrault and Pfister 2011). In
particular, SMEs might face a higher risk of cooperation
failure in cooperating with competitors (Lhuillery and
Pfister 2009). Competing firms could try to capture the
other firm’s knowledge (i.e. to maximise incoming spill-
overs) while, at the same time, trying to minimise the
transfer of their own knowledge to the other firm (to
minimise outgoing spillovers) (Belderbos et al. 2004).
With respect to knowledge breadth and its accessi-
bility, cooperation with competitors is an extreme case,
as it provides rather limited knowledge breadth accom-
panied by difficulties in accessing it (Un et al. 2010).
The resource-based theory of the firm suggests that
firms cooperate with competitors to gain access to
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similar knowledge bases and resources (Arranz and de
Arroyabe 2008; Un et al. 2010). The main motive for
collaborating with competitors is risk and cost sharing in
innovation projects by pooling similar resources (Miotti
and Sachwald 2003; Arranz and de Arroyabe 2008; van
Beers and Zand 2014).
Cooperation with competitors is particularly perti-
nent to firms in high-tech industries, which are more
likely to cooperate with their rivals to pool costs and
risks and increase the speed to new markets (Arranz and
de Arroyabe 2008). Conversely, the cost and risk drivers
may be less compelling and speed to market more
compelling for firms in traditional manufacturing,
which are low- and medium-tech. Responses from the
surveyed firms in our sample are consistent with this
conjecture, as the smallest number of firms (27 or 9%)
cooperate with competitors, while the largest number
engage in vertical cooperation with customers and sup-
pliers (see Section 5.1), which is common with respect
to cooperation for innovation (Lhuillery and Pfister
2009). Moreover, a low proportion of firms cooperating
with competitors may be taken as an indicator of the
difficulties of managing this type of relationship.
In sum, following Lhuillery and Pfister (2009), the
risk of cooperation failure is of high importance when a
firm decides whether to cooperate for innovation with a
particular partner, and this may apply with particular
force to traditional sector SMEs that tend not to use
formal means to protect intellectual property. Very few
empirical studies report behavioural additionality with
respect to cooperation with competitors. Indeed,
Antonioli et al. (2014) found a negative impact of re-
gional policy on this type of cooperation. Therefore, we
posit Hypothesis 2: The impact of public support on
cooperation with competitors will yield a smaller treat-
ment effect than will other forms of cooperation, given
the likelihood of cooperation failure due to mistrust and
opportunistic behaviour.
Theoretical and empirical studies on the role of con-
sultants and other private sector knowledge providers in
‘systems of innovation’ are rather scarce (Tether and
Tajar 2008). With respect to specialist knowledge pro-
viders, Tether and Tajar (2008) argue that they are
complements rather than substitutes in firms’ innovation
activities. This argument is in line with the open inno-
vation model, in which firms explore a broad range of
external knowledge sources. In addition, Tether and
Tajar (2008) found that similar factors determine rela-
tionships between firms and either specialist knowledge
providers or public research organisations. In particular,
they report that firms with limited investment in R&D
are more prone to cooperating with consultants than
with other private or public knowledge providers, an
argument that may be particularly relevant to traditional
sector SMEs whose intellectual property is more typi-
cally tacit than the product of formal R&D. This is
partially reflected in our data, whereby a larger portion
of firms cooperate with consultants than with govern-
ment institutions and public research institutions; see
Table 8 in the Appendix. (Higher education institu-
tions—HEIs—are an exception, but that is understand-
able given the increased pressure on universities to
collaborate more closely with industry.) In the absence
of theory and empirical study of the public support
effects on SME cooperation with private sector consul-
tants, we conjecture that these are similar to support
effects on public-private partnerships. Moreover, if
these effects are different, they are likely to be smaller
if private sector consultants are less trusted than public
sector bodies with knowledge leakage. Accordingly, we
frame Hypothesis 3: The impact of public support on
partnerships with private sector consultants is positive,
and the magnitude of treatment effects is equal to or less
than the impact of public-private partnerships.
The main motive for cooperation with public institu-
tions, such as HEIs and research institutes, is access to
basic knowledge, which might lead to entering new
markets (Belderbos et al. 2004; Faems et al. 2005). This
might also apply with particular force to firms with
limited investment in R&D, which includes traditional
sector SMEs. Other arguments from the literature are
likewise particularly relevant to traditional sector SMEs.
Concerning knowledge breadth, cooperating with pub-
lic institutions provides firms with the broadest knowl-
edge base (Un et al. 2010). Moreover, this mode of
cooperation entails the greatest ease of access, compared
to vertical and horizontal cooperation, as well as low
risk of knowledge leakage and opportunistic behaviour.
Cooperation with public institutions will be particularly
prominent in firms further away from the technological
frontier, as their technological and financial resources
are rather limited (Miotti and Sachwald 2003; Faems
et al. 2005). The confirmation of this argument can be
observed in our sample; namely, descriptive statistics
indicate that one third of SMEs cooperate with HEIs,
which is a similar proportion to the number of firms
engaged in vertical cooperation with customers and
suppliers (see Appendix Table 8). This finding is further
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in line with the argument that universities provide the
largest knowledge base relative to any other cooperative
partner (Un et al. 2010; Foreman-Peck 2013).
Finally, given the prominent role of trust in coopera-
tive innovation, firms are least likely to trust their com-
petitors and most likely to trust government institutions,
which are willing to share knowledge with enterprise
while posing no commercial threat. Thus, appropriability
issues and mistrust are least likely to occur in public-
private partnerships, which may be particularly impor-
tant for traditional sector SMEs that may not engage in
formal protection of intellectual property. Furthermore,
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) report that incoming
spillovers (using external knowledge sources) are an
important factor in private-public partnerships. Con-
versely, the presence of technological information re-
duces the probability of vertical cooperation with cus-
tomers and suppliers. Therefore, we formulate Hypothe-
sis 4: The impact of public support on public-private
partnerships (cooperation with HEIs, government insti-
tutions and public research centres) is positive, and the
magnitude of treatment effects is the largest relative to
other types of cooperation.
4 Methodology
Empirical evaluation of public support requires econo-
metric methods that take into account the potential
endogeneity of public support (David et al. 2000). With
respect to behavioural additionality, endogeneity of pub-
lic support may arise from simultaneity or/and unob-
served firm characteristics that influence both the prob-
ability of receiving innovation support and the probabil-
ity of establishing and maintaining cooperative relation-
ships (Busom and Fernández-Ribas 2008). In both
cases, estimated programme effects are biased and in-
consistent. In Section 5.2 below, we present evidence
consistent with the interpretation of our findings as
programme effects on firms’ cooperative behaviour
rather than as reflecting reverse causation (i.e. the pos-
sibility that causation also runs from cooperation to
programme participation). Here, we focus on the poten-
tial problem of unobserved heterogeneity. In our case,
the potential for endogenous programme selection is
likely to be substantially attenuated, because most sup-
port programmes focus on innovation outputs rather
than on cooperation. Hence, selection on unobservable
firm characteristics is likely to be more influenced by
unobserved aspects of firms’ innovation behaviour than
by unobserved aspects of firms’ cooperation behaviour.
Nonetheless, we address this crucial methodological
issue for two reasons: firstly, some support programmes
do explicitly address cooperation as an output and so
might be subject to biased selection by programme
managers; and, secondly, those firms most inclined to
cooperate may be the ones with the greatest propensity
to self-select into support programmes (Foreman-Peck
2013; Czarnitzki and Delanote 2015).
We estimate the average treatment effect on the treat-
ed (ATT), which indicates the difference in outcomes for
the treated firms (i.e. firms participating in support
programmes) with and without treatment and can be
written as:
ATT ¼ E Y 1jT ¼ 1½ −E Y 0jT ¼ 1½  ð1Þ
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1), E[Y1|
T = 1], is the expected (E) outcome for treated firms (Y1,
where subscript 1 indicates participation) conditional on
their participation (T = 1), while the second term E[Y0|
T = 1] is the expected outcome had treated firms not
participated in the public support programme (where
subscript 0 indicates counterfactual non-participation).
This second counterfactual outcome is not observed but
estimated. Matching estimators, such as the propensity
score matching (PSM), are the most frequently used
estimators in innovation studies (Herrera and Nieto
2008; Cerulli 2010). We follow this practice but adopt
the recommendation from the wider evaluation literature
to test for hidden bias (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity, see
below) (Guo and Fraser 2010). The main limitation of
matching estimators is selection on observables, i.e. this
method only controls for firms’ observed characteristics
(Nannicini 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Guo and
Fraser 2010). In cases when unobserved firm character-
istics influence the treatment assignment, matching
yields biased estimates.
Matching as an evaluation method is based on two
identifying assumptions. The first is the conditional in-
dependence assumption (CIA), unconfoundedness or
selection on observables (Imbens 2004). This condition
states that the outcomes Y0 and Y1 are independent of
treatment assignment T, conditional on observed covar-
iates X. The CIA is a strong assumption and requires that
all relevant observed variables are included in the esti-
mation of treatment effects (Caliendo and Kopeinig
2008; Steiner et al. 2010) and that variables aremeasured
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before treatment assignment (or that they measure fixed
or slow-moving firm characteristics such as those asso-
ciated with otherwise unobserved industrial and regional
influences, which we capture by industry and region
dummies). The second refers to the overlap or common
support condition, which states that both treated and non-
treated firms have a positive probability of receiving a
treatment or not (thus avoiding perfect predictability of a
treatment assignment conditional on X).
Regarding choice among the PSM methods, nearest
neighbour (NN) matching is the most commonly used
estimator in the innovation literature (Herrera and Nieto
2008). In applying the NN estimator, subsidised
(treated) firms are matched with non-subsidised firms
(as a control group) with the closest estimated propen-
sity scores. The crucial step in the matching procedure is
the choice of covariates X. The literature suggests that
all observed variables that simultaneously affect a treat-
ment and an outcome should be included in the estima-
tion of propensity scores (the selection equation)
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Steiner et al. 2010).
Since the propensity score is the probability of re-
ceiving a treatment (in our case, public subsidies), re-
searchers can choose any discrete choice model, be-
cause both probit and logit models usually yield similar
results (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). After the estima-
tion of the propensity score, but prior to applying a
chosen matching estimator, a balancing test should be
conducted. The purpose of a balancing test before
matching (stratification test) is to check how well the
estimated propensity score has succeeded in balancing
covariates. We applied the procedure by Becker and
Ichino (2002), similar to the study by Herrera and Nieto
(2008). After the propensity score is estimated, and if
matching quality is satisfactory, the matched pairs of
treated and non-treated firms are created, based on the
estimated propensity score. Finally, the ATT is calculat-
ed by taking the mean difference in the outcome vari-
ables of the matched treated and non-treated firms.
As a robustness check, the literature on evaluation
methods recommends the estimation of treatment pa-
rameters applying different matching estimators
(Herrera and Nieto 2008; Guo and Fraser 2010). We
apply two alternative approaches: kernel matching and
inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW, i.e.
the ‘double robust’ estimator). Finally, we use two ap-
proaches to sensitivity analysis to check whether the
estimated treatment effects are robust with respect to
unobserved heterogeneity (see Section 6.1).
5 Data and variables
5.1 Data
This study employs a unique survey dataset gathered
in 2010, while the survey questionnaire covers the
period 2005–2009. The sample comprises 312 SMEs
in traditional manufacturing industries from seven
EU regions, mainly (80%) belonging to one of six
manufacturing industries strongly represented in
these regions.5 Descriptive statistics are presented
in Appendix Table 8. Fewer than half of the sur-
veyed firms (45%) participated in one or more pub-
lic support programmes in the period covered by the
survey. The modal firm in the sample had 35 em-
ployees.6 Regarding cooperation partners, the largest
number of firms stated that they engaged in vertical
cooperation (34% of firms cooperated with cus-
tomers and 33% with suppliers), followed by coop-
eration with HEIs (31%) and with consultants
(22%). A small number of firms stated they engaged
in horizontal cooperation with their competitors
(9%). In addition to summary statistics for the full
sample, we also report summary statistics for micro,
small and medium-sized firms. The average values
of the treatment and outcome variables are similar
for different firm size categories.
Afcha Chàvez (2011, p. 106) notes that the ‘relatively
scarce’ empirical evidence on behavioural additionality
arises from ‘data collected through interviews and small
surveys’. This applies to most of the papers detailed in
Table 7 in the Appendix as well as to the present study.
Within this constraint, the sample is drawn from seven
regions in which traditional manufacturing industries
are prominent in the regional economy (as noted in
Section 2) and omits only one of the industries
(chemicals) categorised as ‘traditional manufacturing’
by the European Commission’s European Service
5 Details on how the sample was obtained in different regions are
available in: GPrix Deliverable 3.3, p. 20, and Deliverable 1.7, especially
pp. 10–14. Deliverable 1.7, pp. 16–54, also reports exhaustive descriptive
statistics on the sample. These documents are available from:
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/index.htm (click on the ‘Reports’
tab). The dataset in Stata format together with ‘Do-files’ containing the
syntax used in estimation and unpublished appendices are available from
http://www.staffs.ac.uk/research/cabr/working-papers/.
6 The proportion of micro, small andmedium-sized firms in the sample
is reasonably well balanced: 33% are micro firms with fewer than 10
employees; 43% are small firms with 10 or more and fewer than 50
employees; and 24% are medium-sized firms with 50 or more and
fewer than 250 employees (see Appendix Table 8).
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Innovation Centre (ESIC) (European Commission
2015).7 Following Radicic et al. [2016], our sample
was designed to be useful for informing policy. Accord-
ing to the Oslo Manual ‘broad’ definition of innovation
(OECD 2005), from the 312 SMEs in our sample, 294
(94%) recorded innovative activity within the sample
period. Taking into account good balance—even before
matching—between participants and non-participants in
innovation support programmes, as well as between
firms of different sizes within the broad SME category,
our sample is uniquely informative about the potential
of public programmes to promote cooperation among a
type of firm that matters to policy makers, namely,
innovating SMEs in traditional manufacturing
industries.
Variations in regional (country) contributions to the
sample are to be understood in the context of known
difficulties of obtaining questionnaire responses from
SMEs [Radicic et al. 2016], while industry variations
broadly reflect differences in the size of sectors (e.g.
‘Ceramics’—7.8% of the sample firms—accounts for
just one of the 3-digit components of SIC 2007 Division
23, while ‘Metal manufacturing’—29.8% of the sample
firms—accounts for two 2-digit divisions, 27 and 28).
To anticipate the findings of Section 6.3 below, we find
that our matching estimates are robust to industry het-
erogeneity and that only in one case—the effect of
programme participation on cooperation with govern-
ment research centres—is an estimate not robust to
country heterogeneity.
We do not control for firm age. Indeed, this question
was deliberately omitted from the questionnaire, be-
cause there was unlikely to be sufficient contrast be-
tween young (less than 6 years) and older firms—the
usual distinction in the literature—to provide a useful
control variable in subsequent modelling. Our question-
naire had to be restricted to a length consistent with
gaining responses (the equivalent of four A4 sides in-
cluding introductory material). Hence, questions were
omitted where we had good reason to do so. In this case,
our definition of ‘traditional’ as in part defined by ‘long
established’ applies also to our sample SMEs. From the
39 case studies that accompanied our survey, only the
four French firms have an average year of establishment
after 1980, while eight firms (20%) could date their
foundation only approximately: for example, ‘early
1960s’, ‘pre-1960’, ‘late 1800s’ and ‘1800s’. Otherwise,
omitting those firms whose year of establishment could
not be precisely dated, the average year of establishment
is as follows: Germany—1949; Spain—1966; France—
1998; Italy—1973; Netherlands—1977; Portugal—
1971; and UK—1943. Not only are there no young
firms in our sample but, since their establishment, many
of these firms have changed greatly with respect to, for
example, size, product mix and ownership.
5.2 Model specification
The treatment variable (Participation) is a binary indi-
cator equal to 1 if the firm responded positively to the
question: ‘Did your enterprise during the five years
2005 to 2009 receive any public support for your inno-
vation activities?’ The seven outcome variables measur-
ing firms’ cooperation activities are defined as binary
indicators equal to 1 if the firm cooperates with the
following potential partners (and 0 otherwise): suppliers
(Coop_suppliers); customers (Coop_customers); com-
pe t i t o r s (Coop_compe t i t o r s ) ; c on su l t an t s
(Coop_consultants); HEIs (Coop_HEIs); government
research centres (Coop_government); and public re-
search centres (Coop_centres) (see Appendix Table 8
for descriptive statistics).
Control variables include a continuous variable (Size)
to account for the heterogeneity of SMEs. Following
Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), the literature sug-
gests an ambiguous association between firm size and
cooperation for innovation. We model exporting activi-
ties (Export) as a dichotomous variable measuring the
share of total sales sold abroad in 2009. Exporting can
have a positive impact on cooperation, given that ex-
porters potentially have a larger network of cooperation
partners than do non-exporting firms. Furthermore,
exporting firms might have more incentive to innovate
as a result of competitive pressure on international mar-
kets and thus be more likely to self-select into public
support programmes (Busom and Fernández-Ribas
2008; Cerulli and Potí 2012; Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento 2013). In addition, the model includes the vari-
able measuring competitive pressure (Competition),
which is equal to 1 if firms responded ‘Very strong’ to
the question: ‘How would you judge the competition in
your main market(s)?’, and 0 otherwise. According to
Garcia andMohnen (2010), firms facing a higher degree
of competition could be more likely to need public
support.
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/esic/about/
keywords/index_en.htm.
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In addition, to control for otherwise unobserved
sources of firm heterogeneity that are associated with
industry characteristics, we include sectoral dummy
variables for all six industries of interest: automotive;
ceramics; leather; metallurgy; textile; and food process-
ing. The base category is other traditional manufacturing
industries. Likewise, to control for otherwise unob-
served sources of firm heterogeneity that are associated
with country (region) characteristics, the model includes
six country/region dummy variables for Germany, Italy,
France, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands (with the
UK being the base category).
One limitation of our specification reflects our data,
which constrains the analysis to cross-sectional differ-
ences, whereas longitudinal and cross-country survey
data to analyse differences in cooperation or to control
for lagged cooperation would be preferable. Unfortu-
nately, to our knowledge, no such data for SMEs in
traditional manufacturing industries exists.8 Yet there
is a concern that, because we are unable to control for
previous cooperation, reverse causality may be impor-
tant; namely, instead of or as well as public funding
inducing firms to change their cooperation behaviour,
it may be the case that firms with a history of coopera-
tion are more likely to apply for funding.9 While our
dataset does not include previous cooperation, it does
include a question designed to investigate a variety of
SME needs to facilitate participation in innovation sup-
port programmes, one of which is ‘Adequate networks
of potential partners’. Seventy-four firms responded that
the availability of such networks was either of ‘no
importance’ or ‘low importance’ to participation in sup-
port programmes and so, by implication, evinced
established cooperative behaviour independently of pro-
gramme participation. From these responses, we derived
a variableWell_networked. In our sample, 24% of firms
that did not participate in support programmes were
‘well networked’ and 26% of firms that did participate,
a difference that is not statistically different from 0 (p =
0.68 in a standard t test). Moreover, when added as a
regressor to the model reported in the next section, the
Well_networked variable did not prove to be a signifi-
cant predictor of programme participation (with a t-
statistic of below 1) and did not improve the quality of
matching. This evidence that prior networking and,
hence, established cooperative behaviour did not exert
any discernible influence on the propensity to partici-
pate in innovation support programmes goes some way
to allay concerns that the findings reported below may
reflect reverse causation rather than programme effects.
Our dataset also provides direct information on re-
spondents’ subjective perceptions of the impact of sup-
port measures that supports a causal interpretation of our
econometric estimates. The survey included the follow-
ing question: ‘For the first support measure … which
were the impacts from your participation on …?’ The
same question was presented also for a second support
measure, where applicable. Twenty potential impacts
were listed, including three (arguably four) directly
pertaining to cooperation: ‘Formation of new partner-
ships and networks’; ‘Improved R&D linkages with
universities and research institutes’; ‘Improved R&D
linkages with other business organisations’; and
(arguably) ‘Improved commercial linkages with other
organisations’. These responses can play no role in our
econometric analysis, since they exist only for pro-
gramme participants (‘treated’ firms). However, they
are informative about what respondents believe to have
been the influence of support measures on cooperation.
In Table 1, the rows give short forms of the four impacts
listed above and the columns record the responses. For
comparison, and to demonstrate that the respondents
discriminated between impacts in their responses, we
add two more impacts: on ‘Speed of completion of the
innovation project’ (the third highest impact for the first
support measure and the highest for the second) and on
‘Safety and environmental certification’ (the lowest im-
pact in both cases).
Seventy-four per cent of respondents attribute at least
some degree of importance to their first support measure
in promoting the ‘Formation of new partnerships and
networks’ (the sum of ‘Low’ importance, ‘Important’,
‘High’ and ‘Very high’ importance as a percentage of
123). Seventy percent respond similarly for each of the
other three types of cooperation. In comparison, ‘Speed
of completion of the innovation project’ was so identi-
fied by 85% and ‘Safety and environmental certifica-
tion’ by only 41% of respondents. For the smaller num-
ber of firms having received a second support measure,
the comparison is similar: new partnerships and net-
works, 77% (n = 61); speed of completion, 84% (n =
62); and safety and environmental certification 46%
(n = 59).
8 However, a single-country study for Spain using the Survey of
Business Strategies (known by the Spanish initials ESEE) would
enable panel analysis but without the full range of cooperative partners
considered in the present study.
9 We thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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The evidence available in our dataset is consistent
in going some way to allay concerns that the find-
ings reported below may reflect reverse causation
rather than programme effects: first, evidence—ad-
mittedly weak—that prior networking and, hence,
established cooperative behaviour did not exert any
discernible influence on the propensity to participate
in innovation support programmes; and, second, di-
rect—albeit subjective—evidence that innovation
support measures promote cooperation. Moreover,
the sensitivity analysis reported below adds some
reassurance that the estimated treatment effects are
not driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Results and discussion of the empirical analysis
6.1 Results
The propensity score was estimated by a logit mod-
el, which is the most frequently used model in this
line of research (Herrera and Nieto 2008). The re-
sults are reported in Table 2. The results indicate a
statistically significant positive effect of exporting
(p = 0.071) on programme participation together
with two positive country effects (Spain—p = 0.000
and Germany—p = 0.013) and one negative industry
effect (Food processing—p = 0.081). However, in
the matching approach, the main focus is not on
the estimated coefficients but rather on whether co-
variates between matched pairs of treated and un-
treated firms are balanced given the estimated pro-
pensity scores. The literature on matching suggests
the inclusion of even those covariates that are
statistically insignificant, because their inclusion
does not increase bias in subsequent matching esti-
mations (Millimet and Tchernis 2009). Moreover,
our study is limited by a lack of information on
the selection process, which means that the largest
possible number of covariates should be modelled in
the estimation of the propensity score (Millimet and
Tchernis 2009; Steiner et al. 2010).
The algorithm by Becker and Ichino (2002) indi-
cated satisfactory balancing properties of the esti-
mated propensity scores. Moreover, few observa-
tions are lost due to the common support restriction,
which indicates a large overlap of estimated propen-
sity scores among subsidised and non-subsidised
SMEs.10
Table 3 presents the estimated ATTeffects. These are
fairly consistent across the three matching estimators.
Accordingly, we interpret the mean effects for each type
of cooperative partner.
6.2 Discussion
Table 3 reports a positive but heterogeneous impact of
public support on SME cooperation for innovation. In
addition to reporting the estimated ATTs, we also test for
unobserved heterogeneity. Although no previous study
on behavioural additionality reports sensitivity analysis
with respect to ‘hidden bias’, the evaluation literature
suggests this as a complement to propensity score anal-
ysis, because the assumption on unconfoundedness can-
not be tested directly (Nannicini 2007; Caliendo and
Kopeinig 2008; Ichino et al. 2008; Guo and Fraser
10 These results are available on request.
Table 1 Respondents’ perceptions of the impact of support measures
Impact of support measure 1 on: Degrees of importance (frequency of responses)
No Low Important High Very high
External relationships (n = 123) 32 31 24 21 15
R&D linkages (universities, etc.) (n = 125) 38 25 26 21 15
R&D linkages (other businesses) (n = 122) 36 32 29 18 7
Commercial linkages (n = 120) 36 31 28 18 7
Speed of completion (n = 124) 19 15 39 32 19
Safety and environmental certification (n = 123) 72 21 23 5 2
Source: Calculated from the GPrix database (GPrix Deliverable 1.7—impact assessment of measures on SMEs; GPrix Deliverable
3.3—Recommendations Report; http://www.gprix.eu/)
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2010). In this study, we apply two types of sensitivity
analysis. The simulation-based approach (kernel
matching with replacement) augments the propensity
score model with a simulated measure of unobserved
heterogeneity; if the resulting simulated ATT (Table 3,
column 5) is close to the ATT estimated under the CIA
(column 2), then the estimate is likely to be robust to
unobserved heterogeneity (Becker and Caliendo 2007;
Nannicini 2007; Ichino et al. 2008). Alternatively, the
Rosenbaum bounding approach (NN matching without
replacement) determines how large the impact of an
unobserved variable has to be to render the treatment
effect statistically insignificant, under the assumption
that this variable simultaneously affects both treatment
assignment and the outcome variable (Rosenbaum
2002; DiPrete and Gangl 2004); this approach provides
the two Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistics, one
to test for over-estimation of the treatment effect when
unobserved heterogeneity is suspected and the other to
test for under-estimation (Becker and Caliendo 2007).
These results of the Rosenbaum approach are reported
in Table 3, column 6 (the full results are available on
request).
We now relate the estimated ATTs to our four
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is weakly supported: pub-
lic support has a positive impact on vertical coop-
eration with customers and suppliers. However, of
the types of cooperation significantly promoted by
public support, the impact on vertical cooperation is
the smallest: the mean ATT for cooperation with
suppliers suggests an increased probability of coop-
eration of 11.4 percentage points (pp) and for coop-
eration with customers of 10.4 pp. From the per-
spective of statistical significance, these estimates
are not fully robust. Nonetheless, these estimates
may be economically plausible. Because cooperation
along the supply chain between partners with com-
plementary competencies is well established in the
‘innovation model’ of manufacturing SMEs, there
may be only a minimal role at the margin for public
support in promoting such cooperation in the sample
regions (which are all from developed market
economies).
Hypothesis 2 is supported in part. We hypothesised a
‘small’ effect of public support in promoting coopera-
tion with competitors relative to other forms of cooper-
ation. Yet, we find that public support is ineffective in
promoting cooperation with competitors, whereas it is
effective—albeit in varying degrees—in promoting all
other types of cooperation. In no case is the estimated
ATT significantly different from 0, a finding supported
by both sensitivity tests. According to Clarysse et al.
(2009), with respect to the types of cooperative partners,
the risk of cooperation failure is particularly high for
cooperation with competitors, and our results suggest
that innovation policy instruments might not be able to
mitigate this risk. These suggestions from the literature
may apply with even greater force to SMEs in traditional
manufacturing.
Our estimates uniformly support the two hypoth-
eses relating to knowledge providers. In line with
Hypothesis 3, the impact of public support is on
average to increase the probability of partnerships
with private sector consultants by 21.2 pp. More-
over, while this effect is about the same as the effect
on cooperation with government research centres
and public research centres, this effect is less than
the impact on cooperation with HEIs (the 95% con-
fidence intervals of the respective ATT estimates do
not overlap). These findings are supported by both
sensitivity tests: the first confirms the level of sta-
tistical significance and the second suggests no bias
Table 2 Results of logit estimation. Dependent variable: partici-
pation in public support programmes in the period 2005–2009
Variables Coefficient (standard error)
Size − 0.003 (0.003)
Competition − 0.202 (0.311)
Export 0.008* (0.004)
Spain 1.965*** (0.507)
France 0.660 (0.467)
Germany 1.184** (0.479)
Italy 0.306 (0.432)
Netherlands 0.287 (0.479)
Portugal 0.744 (0.588)
Leather − 0.663 (0.732)
Ceramics − 0.132 (0.559)
Textile − 0.604 (0.481)
Mechanical/metallurgy 0.362 (0.358)
Automotive 0.106 (0.509)
Food processing − 0.888* (0.509)
Constant − 0.772** (0.364)
No of obs. 295
Log-likelihood − 187.054
Pseudo R2 0.079
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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in the estimate. Finally, in line with Hypothesis 4,
the effects of public support on the three types of
cooperation described as public-private partnerships
are all positive and uniformly significant at the 1%
level and are all supported by both sensitivity tests.
Moreover, each of the three types of cooperation—
with HEIs, government research centres and public
research centres—responds more to public support
than does any other type of cooperation: on average,
treatment assignment increases the probability of
cooperating with HEIs by 36.0 pp; of cooperating
with government research centres by 24.8 pp; and of
cooperating with public research centres by 20.4 pp.
Following the discussion in Section 3.2, acquiring
external knowledge through cooperation could be
subject to cooperation failure. In this case, increased
cooperation with public institutions may be facilitat-
ed by greater trust insofar as these institutions are
unlikely to appropriate a firm’s intellectual property.
This heterogeneous effectiveness may be instruc-
tive for policy makers: the induced behavioural im-
pact of participation in public innovation support
programmes on SME cooperation with external
knowledge providers is relatively great; the impact
on vertical cooperation is relatively limited; and the
lack of any discernible impact on horizontal coop-
eration may reflect insuperable barriers to such co-
operation for manufacturing SMEs. These findings
suggest that the broad range of innovation support
programmes has the effect—whether intended or
unintended—of promoting the firms’ cooperation.
Coupled with our suggestion of cumulative causa-
tion between firms’ behaviour and emergent system
effects (in Section 3.1 above), these findings also
suggest a channel through which public policy can
contribute to the consolidation and extension of
innovation ecosystems.
6.3 Heterogeneous effects of public funding
In this section, we investigate whether or not and, if
so, to what extent the effects of public funding on
cooperation for innovation differ across countries,
industries, sources of funding and firm size catego-
ries. The number of observations precludes separate
estimation by country and industry but proved suf-
ficient to enable separate estimates to be obtained
for different sources of funding and firm size
categories.
We investigate heterogeneity by industries and
countries to check whether or not our findings have
external validity (i.e. whether or not they may rea-
sonably be used to inform policy in different indus-
tries and countries). To this end, we use a two-step
approach11: first, we regress the estimated treatment
effects on industry and country dummies together
with firm-level characteristics that may be associat-
ed with heterogeneous effects; then we conduct sep-
arate matching analysis after excluding countries or
industries displaying significant effects. Appendix
Table 9 reports OLS regressions on the ATTs from
‘any type of cooperation’ on two sets of variables:
first, the same variables as appear in the logit model
(Table 2); and, as a robustness check, this specifica-
tion augmented with additional variables (namely,
dummy variables for categories of innovative sales
as a proportion of turnover; types of innovation—
product, process, organisational and marketing; and
membership of an enterprise group). The same pro-
cedure was repeated for each of our seven coopera-
tion outcome variables (these results are not reported
but are available on-line in a Stata log file; see
footnote 3 above). Each of the resulting 16 regres-
sions was estimated with robust standard errors, is
well specified with respect to functional form (ac-
cording to the Ramsey test) and shows no signs of
excessive multicollinearity (according to the mean
variable inflation factors). Table 4 give a qualitative
summary of the estimates of interest, reporting the
industry and country dummies significant at the
conventional 5% level: + (−) indicates positive
(negative) and significant; 0 indicates a non-
significant estimate; and blank cells signify statisti-
cally insignificant effects from both models.
From 48 possibilities among the industries, five
robustly reveal heterogeneity in our estimated ef-
fects (i.e. proving to be statistically significant and
positive or negative in both models). Three of these
reveal heterogeneities in the effect of programme
participation on cooperation with customers, al-
though we interpret the uniformly positive signifi-
cant estimates for five of the industries to be sug-
gesting that the auto industry has more in common
with the omitted ‘other industries’ category than
with the other traditional industries in this respect.
The other two reveal heterogeneities in the effect of
11 Our thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this procedure.
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programme participation on cooperation with consul-
tants. In addition, we note possible heterogeneity in
cooperation with HEIs. We do not have sufficient ob-
servations to robustness check our matching estimates
reported in Table 3 for particular industries (see
Appendix Table 8 for the proportions of the sample
accounted for by each industry and country). Instead,
step 2 of our procedure is to omit industries from the
sample where these are potential sources of heterogene-
ity to assess the extent to which Table 3 estimates are
driven by industry outliers:
1. For cooperation with customers, omitting ‘auto’
2. For cooperation with consultants omitting ‘leather’
and ‘food’
3. For cooperation with HEIs omitting ‘leather’ and
‘mechanical’
From 48 possibilities among the countries, six ro-
bustly reveal heterogeneity in our estimated effects. The
two associated with Germany both concern particular
types of cooperation with other firms (suppliers and
competitors) but not with knowledge providers. Con-
versely, we have evidence of heterogeneity associated
with Spain in each category of cooperation with knowl-
edge providers as well as the only evidence of hetero-
geneity in the effect of programme participation on
cooperation generally (aggregate cooperation). Accord-
ingly, we omit countries to assess the extent to which
Table 3 estimates are driven by country outliers:
1. For both cooperation with suppliers and cooperation
with competitors, omitting Germany
2. For cooperation with each of the four types of
knowledge provider, omitting Spain
Robustness checking for the effects of industry and
country outliers gives rise to three and six new ATT
estimates, respectively. These are reported in Table 5,
together with the full sample estimates from Table 3 for
ease of comparison.
There is no evidence that our matching estimates
are driven by industry heterogeneity. Although the
effect of programme participation on cooperation
with customers gains statistical significance, the size
of the estimate is little changed and, in all respects,
is very close to the double robust estimate reported
in Table 3 (0.095, also significant at the 10% level).
Lack of industry heterogeneity is consistent with our
argument in Sect ion 2 that the tradi t ional
manufacturing industries constitute a coherent—
hence, homogeneous—unit of analysis. Among the
country estimates, only one reveals substantial
change: the effect of programme participation on
cooperation with government research centres col-
lapses in size and loses statistical significance once
Spain is omitted from the sample. Otherwise, coun-
try heterogeneity makes little noteworthy difference
to estimated programme effects on cooperation with
consultants and HEIs; moreover, although the size of
the effect on cooperation with public research cen-
tres is notably reduced, the full sample and the
reduced sample estimates are statistically different
only at the 1% level (p = 0.033). We conclude that
Table 3 estimates are not unduly driven by industry
or country outliers.
Table 4 Industry and country heterogeneities in the results reported in Table 3
Outcome variables Industries Countries
Leather Ceramic Textile Mechanical Auto Food Spain France Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal
Small model/large model
Aggregate cooperation 0/+
Suppliers −/−
Customers +/0 +/+ +/+ +/+ +/0 −/0
Competitors −/−
Consultants −/− −/− +/+
HEIs 0/− +/0 +/+
Government +/+
Public research centres +/+ +/0
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Table 6 reports estimates from our preferred NN
matching approach (Table 3) of the effects of public
funding by sources of funding and according to firm
size. For ease of comparison, column 1 reproduces the
estimates from all sources reported in Table 3. Separate
investigation of support from national sources (includ-
ing local or regional sources) and from the EU reveals
some evidence that public support from both sources
promotes cooperation with suppliers (comparing col-
umns 2 and 3 with column 1), while only national
support promotes cooperation with customers (column
2). As expected, in contrast to the effects of EU support,
national support promotes cooperation with government
and other (nationally based) public research institutions.
Yet both national and EU support promote cooperation
with other knowledge suppliers (consultants and HEIs).
Turning to our estimated effects disaggregated by
firm size (columns 4, 5 and 6), our previous finding
of weak effects on inter-firm cooperation is qualified
by evidence of positive effects on cooperation with
suppliers among small firms and on both cooperation
with customers and cooperation with competitors
among medium firms. However, such effects are not
systematic. The evidence on cooperation with knowl-
edge providers is also qualified, although only a
little. Although the effects of public support on co-
operation with government and other (nationally
based) public research institutions remain systemat-
ic—uniformly substantial and significant across firm
sizes—the evidence on cooperation with consultants
and HEIs remains strong only for micro and small
firms (although because these effects for medium
firms are so imprecisely estimated, the 95% confi-
dence intervals—not reported—overlap with the es-
timates for micro and small firms). However, in spite
of this additional evidence on the heterogeneity of
public support effects on cooperation across firms of
different size, we can still conclude that the weight of
our evidence suggests a more systematic impact of
public support on cooperation with knowledge pro-
viders than on cooperation with suppliers, customers
or competitors.
We concluded Section 6.1 by suggesting that public
innovation support programmes promote firms’ cooper-
ative behaviour and thus contribute to the consolidation
and extension of innovation ecosystems. The evidence
presented in this section provides some tentative guid-
ance on the effective allocation of public support. First,
only national support promotes cooperation betweenTa
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firms and national research centres (government and
public in Table 6), while either EU or national support
is effective in promoting cooperation with both consul-
tants and HEIs. Second, public support promotes coop-
eration between firms of all sizes and national research
centres, while public support for micro and small firms
most effectively promotes cooperation with consultants
and HEIs. Conversely, support for medium firms may
do more to promote inter-firm cooperation.
7 Conclusion
Following a statement of our main findings, we con-
clude by considering: (i) different dimensions of hetero-
geneity in our findings and their implications for
policymaking; (ii) the contribution of our findings to
the understanding of SME innovation ecosystems in
traditional manufacturing industry; (iii) the implications
of our findings for the promotion of incremental inno-
vation in traditional manufacturing industry; and (iv) the
implications of our findings for the evaluation of public
innovation support programmes. Finally, we consider
the limitations of this study.
By applying matching methods to estimate ATT ef-
fects, we find that innovation support programmes for
SMEs in traditional manufacturing sectors do not pro-
mote cooperation with competitors, marginally promote
cooperation with customers and suppliers and strongly
promote cooperation with external knowledge pro-
viders, i.e. private sector consultants, government re-
search centres, public research centres and HEIs. These
findings are similar to the effects previously reported in
the literature for other sectors.
Further, we explore potential heterogeneities in the
effects of public support with respect to countries, in-
dustries, sources of funding and firm size categories. In
our sample, industry heterogeneity does not unduly
affect our estimates, which is consistent with our argu-
ment that traditional manufacturing industry is a coher-
ent unit of analysis. Moreover, noteworthy country het-
erogeneity is limited to the findings that upon omitting
the Spanish observations (i) the estimated effect of
public support on cooperation with government research
centres loses statistical significance and (ii) the estimat-
ed effect on cooperation with public research centres—
while remaining substantial and statistically signifi-
cant—approximately halves. These robustness checks
suggest that our results have external validity within theTa
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domain of SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry
and, so within this domain, may reasonably be used to
inform policy on public support. Nonetheless, we can-
not be definitive, as our dataset has too few observations
to permit separate estimation by industry and country.
Accordingly, policy makers should always be alert to
the possibility of country and industry variations.
Sources of funding are associated with some note-
worthy heterogeneities. National support promotes co-
operation with government and other (nationally based)
public research institutions, although the former finding
may be unduly influenced by the Spanish observations.
Conversely, both national and EU support promote co-
operation with consultants and HEIs, which is a typical
objective of EU support. Finally, although the effects of
public support on cooperation with government and
other (nationally based) public research institutions re-
main uniformly substantial and significant across firm
sizes, the evidence on cooperation with consultants and
HEIs remains strong only for micro and small firms.
However, the weight of our evidence still suggests a
more systematic impact of public support on coopera-
tion with knowledge providers than on inter-firm
cooperation.
Our findings make a twofold contribution to knowl-
edge on the potential role of public policy in supporting
the development of innovation ecosystems. On the one
hand, in Section 3.1, we argue that cooperation by firms
with other firms and related institutions gives rise to
emergent system properties that positively feedback
onto firm-level cooperation for innovation. In the pres-
ence of this cumulative causation effect, our findings not
only provide evidence for a direct influence of public
policy on firms’ cooperative behaviour but also suggest
an indirect influence via support for the well-
functioning of the wider innovation ecosystem. On the
other hand, our findings are consistent with the market
emphasis of the innovation ecosystems literature in sug-
gesting that the role of public policy may be less related
to the creation of innovation ecosystems and muchmore
to do with their well-functioning and consolidation. At
the inception of the firms’ innovation ecosystems are
their relationships with other firms. In this paper, we
report economically small and by no means uniformly
statistically significant positive effects of public innova-
tion support programmes on cooperation with either
suppliers or customers, and only one estimate suggest-
ing that such programmes promote cooperation with
competitors. In contrast, we report mainly statistically
significant and economically substantial effects of pub-
lic innovation support programmes on cooperation with
both private and public sector knowledge providers. In
conclusion, public innovation support programmes can
assist SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry to
consolidate and/or extend their innovation ecosystems
beyond the more familiar partners of suppliers, cus-
tomers—and, possibly, competitors—by promoting co-
operation with a range of knowledge providers. Accord-
ingly, in this case, we characterise the role of public
policy as systems conforming rather than systems cre-
ating. Because of heterogeneity among ecosystems
(Brown and Mason 2017), we cannot offer this conclu-
sion as generally applicable. However, we argue that
public policies promoting cooperation for innovation by
SMEs may be particularly effective in traditional
manufacturing industries, because such public support
may contribute to offsetting the loss of systemic benefits
arising from deindustrialisation and the associated thin-
ning out of supply chains and supporting institutions.
Previous studies have associated behavioural
additionality most strongly with radical innovation.
Afcha Chàvez (2011) argues that this is particularly
the case with respect to cooperation with universities
and public research organisations. Given our argument
that SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries carry
out mainly incremental innovation, then our findings not
only extend knowledge about SME cooperation to a
previously neglected but important sector of
manufacturing industry but also to a somewhat
neglected but important type of innovation. The
evidence reported in this study suggests that
innovation support programmes induce cooperative
behaviour by SMEs in traditional manufacturing
industries performing incremental innovation. This is
consistent with Clarysse et al. (2009) who report larger
behavioural additionality for less R&D intensive SMEs
than for highly R&D intensive large firms. The corollary
is that innovation support for SMEs in traditional
manufacturing industries may have been provided at
below the socially optimum level. Our findings extend
the range of contexts in which policy makers should
emphasise measures designed to attenuate cooperation
failures (Zeng et al. 2010).
Our findings also have major implications for the eval-
uation of innovation support programmes. A previous
evaluation of the effects of innovation support
programmes using the same data as this study [Radicic
et al. 2016] reports output additionality. However, the
Promoting cooperation in innovation ecosystems: evidence from European traditional manufacturing SMEs
present study suggests that focussing only on innovation
output effects in a cross-sectional context neglects induced
cooperation effects, which unfold over time with further
positive effects on innovation.We argue that these dynam-
ic effects may arise for two reasons. First, induced coop-
eration between firms and complementary institutions con-
tributes to the wider innovation ecosystem, which in turn
positively influences firms’ cooperation and innovation
behaviour. If these induced or feedback effects from im-
proved functioning of firms’ innovation ecosystems are
not accounted for by evaluation studies, then the findings
of evaluation studies may be negatively biased. Second,
within firms, behavioural additionality is also likely to
induce further output additionality (Davenport et al.
1998). [Radicic et al. 2016] find output additionality from
innovation support programmes and the present study
finds positive cooperation effects. Together, these studies
question Georghiou (2002) who argues that input and/or
output additionality and behavioural additionality are
substitutable, and provide support for Clarysse et al.
(2009) who argue that they are complementary. In turn,
complementarity suggests a positive feedback process for
SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry: public inno-
vation support programmes lead directly to input and/or
output additionality and indirectly to (induced) coopera-
tion (behavioural additionality) which, in turn, gives rise to
further input and/or output additionality.
To investigate the dynamics of these two
hypothesised processes will require the study of rich
longitudinal data. However, even in the absence of
such empirical investigation, the proposed dynamic
linkage between support, innovation and cooperative
effects leading to second-round innovation effects
(… and so on) suggests that the output additionality
among SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries
reported in [Radicic et al. 2016]—as well as by
other studies for other sectors and for different types
of firm—might be underestimated. We conclude that
once we take into account that the effects of
programmes targeting innovation outputs may oper-
ate both directly and indirectly over time (both be-
tween and within firms), then the estimated effects
are likely to be larger and the case for policy support
stronger. This will be the case even using current
datasets and methods, as this study demonstrates. A
corollary is that evaluation studies of innovation
support programmes for SMEs should be designed
to capture not only input and/or output additionality
but also behavioural and systemic effects.
This study has limitations that remain to be ad-
dressed. The first is reverse causality. Within the limita-
tions of our cross-section dataset, we are unable to
control for unobserved heterogeneity, in particular with
respect to previous cooperative behaviour. Hence, we
are concerned that continually cooperating firms are
more likely to apply for funding, in which case public
funding may be wrongly identified as a cause of coop-
eration behaviour. Our survey data provides some evi-
dence consistent with programme effects rather than
reverse causation, and sensitivity analysis adds some
reassurance that the estimated treatment effects are not
driven by unobserved heterogeneity. Nonetheless, while
we have gone as far as our data and current techniques
permit, we acknowledge that we cannot be definitive
with regard to causation. Accordingly, advances in both
respects are among our suggestions for further research.
The second limitation concerns the extent of external
validity. Investigation of industry and country heteroge-
neities leads us to conclude that the traditional
manufacturing industries constitute a coherent unit of
analysis and that country heterogeneity is minimal.
Nonetheless, in the absence of sufficient observations
to estimate cooperation effects separately by industry
and country, we cannot conclude definitively that we
have fully accounted for industry and country biases.
While our results may reasonably be used to in-
form policy on public support for SMEs in tradi-
tional manufacturing industries in developed mar-
ket economies, policy makers should always be
alert to the possibility of country and industry
variations. Additional limitations may be acknowl-
edged in brief: (a) available data does not allow
assessment of the effectiveness of public support
on other types of behavioural additionality, such as
cognitive capacity additionality (Fier et al. 2006;
Busom and Fernández-Ribas 2008); (b) cross-
sectional data precludes exploration of the
medium- to long-run programme effects on coop-
erative behaviour (Busom and Fernández-Ribas
2008); and (c) it would be informative to explore
whether additionality of a support programme
would be affected by the breadth of cooperative
partnerships.
Funding information This research benefitted from the Euro-
pean Commission, FP7-SME-2009-1; Grant Number: 245459
(http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/index.htm/): Which support
measures can help regions based on traditional industries to
prosper in the knowledge economy?
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Table 9 OLS regression of firm-level treatment effects on indus-
tries, countries and firm-level characteristics. Dependent variable:
GenCoop—ATTs from any type of cooperation
Variables Coeff. (robust
SEs)
Coeff. (robust
SEs)
Size (number of
employees)
− 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Leather industry 0.174 (0.182) 0.059 (0.203)
Ceramics industry 0.055 (0.147) 0.044 (0.154)
Textile industry 0.213* (0.128) 0.192 (0.136)
Mechanical/metallurgy
industry
0.108 (0.106) 0.049 (0.116)
Automotive industry 0.118 (0.151) 0.181 (0.159)
Food processing industry − 0.056 (0.124) − 0.101 (0.141)
Competition (in
product markets)
− 0.017 (0.086) − 0.098 (0.088)
Spain 0.222* (0.120) 0.263** (0.124)
France − 0.143 (0.146) − 0.043 (0.141)
Germany 0.088 (0.130) 0.232 (0.150)
Italy 0.042 (0.115) 0.173 (0.126)
Netherlands − 0.222 (0.166) − 0.214 (0.166)
Portugal − 0.056 (0.166) − 0.051 (0.173)
Exports − 0.003** (0.001) − 0.003** (0.001)
Innovative sales,
1–5% of turnover
− 0.015 (0.171)
Innovative sales,
6–10% of turnover
0.028 (0.182)
Innovative sales,
11–15% of turnover
− 0.025 (0.191)
Innovative sales,
16–25% of turnover
0.011 (0.184)
Innovative sales,
26–50% of turnover
− 0.177 (0.213)
Innovative sales,
> 50% of turnover
− 0.126 (0.195)
Product innovation 0.054 (0.126)
Process innovation − 0.384*** (0.126)
Organisational
innovation
0.056 (0.101)
Marketing
innovation
0.043 (0.078)
Belong to a group − 0.021 (0.109)
Constant 0.487*** (0.101) 0.718*** (0.195)
R2 0.07 0.14
No of obs. 287 263
Ramsey RESET
test
Prob > F = 0.47 Prob > F = 0.82
Variance inflation
factor (mean)
1.51 2.02
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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